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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, Utah issued an
Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine on December 8, 2000. Appellant timely filed a
petition for interlocutory appeal and the Supreme Court of Utah granted that petition on
March 9, 2001. Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court correctly decided, as a matter of law, that no

recovery is available for diminishment in value of the remaining property in a
condemnation proceeding where such diminishment is the direct result of the Utah
Department of Transportation's highway reconstruction project, and where the
reconstruction project necessarily involves a partial taking of Harvey Real Estate's
adjacent property?
The question is one of law, and the standard of review is de novo. See, e.g.. Carpet
Barnv. Dept. of Transp.. 786 P.2d 770. 772-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1990): Utah State Road
Comm'nv. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974).
This issue is preserved for appeal in Harvey Real Estate's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding the closure of the intersection and
the related arguments. (R. 435-45 and R. 567).
2.

Whether the trial court's determination to preclude Harvey Real Estate's

experts from testifying as to any loss of value to Defendant's remaining property resulting
from Plaintiffs highway restructuring project was appropriate under Utah Code
Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996)?

1

"The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law," Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 1999 UT 36, TJ17, 977 P.2d 1201. and on appeal, the Court accords no deference
to the legal conclusions of the district court. See kL
This issue is preserved for appeal in Harvey Real Estate's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine regarding the closure of the intersection and
the related arguments. (R. 435-45 and R. 567).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

The Utah Constitution guarantees: "Private property shall not be taken or

damaged for public use without just compensation." Art. 1, § 22. (emphasis added)
(attached hereto as Addendum "A'*).
2.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996) provides, in relevant part, that in

eminent domain proceedings:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed bv the plaintiff.
(emphasis added) (attached hereto as Addendum "B").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves damages resulting from a partial taking of property ("the
Harvey Property") belonging to Defendant Harvey Real Estate. Because of its unique
location at the intersection of Highway 89 and the Old Mountain Road in Farmington, the
Harvey Property lies in the path of a frontage road which Plaintiff Utah Department of
2

Transportation (uUDOTv) proposes to build. The frontage road is necessary to UDOT's
proposed restructuring of Highway 89. UDOT exercised its eminent domain power to
acquire the property it needed from Harvey Real Estate, but UDOT now contests the
claim that Harvey Real Estate is entitled to compensation for the significant diminishment
in market value caused to the remaining property. A pretrial hearing was held on
September 21, 1999. UDOT subsequently filed a Motion in Limine requesting the district
court to limit the admissibility of evidence and exclude testimony pertaining to any
damages to Harvey Real Estate's remaining property resulting from UDOT's
reconstruction project. On May 4, 2000, the district court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on UDOT's Motion in Limine. The true and correct copy of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Addendum "C." On
December 8, 2000 the district court issued an order granting UDOT's Motion in Limine
precluding Harvey Real Estate's experts from testifying as to any loss of value resulting
from UDOT's actions, further stating that the jury would be instructed that no recovery is
appropriate for the effects of the highway reconstruction project on the value of the
remaining property. A true and correct copy of the district court's Order Granting
UDOT's Motion in Limine is attached hereto as Addendum "D."
UDOT and Harvey Real Estate appealed on separate issues. In its Order of Stay
and Certification for Interlocutor} Appeal, dated December 8, 2000, the district court
certified for interlocutor}' appeal the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
excluding testimony as to damages resulting from UDOT's highway restructuring.
B. Statement of Facts
1.

Highway 89 from Farmington. Utah to South Ogden, Utah has long been a major

transportation route, and it has undergone improvements over the years as its use has
expanded. (R. at 545.)
3

2.

In the 195(Ts, portions of Highwa\ 89 were converted to a limited access highway,

with limited direct access from abutting properties. (Id.)
3.

Harvey Real Estate is the owner in fee simple of the Harvey Property, which is

approximately 160 acres of vacant land directly abutting the intersection of Highway 89
and the Old Mountain Road and located at the southeast corner of that intersection. (R.
at 546, 554) (R 554 attached hereto as Addendum UE"). The intersection of Highway 89
and Old Mountain Road is not located on the Harvey Property, but directly abuts it. (R.
at 554.)
4.

The Harvey Property has direct access to Highway 89 and to the Old Mountain

Road. (R. at 546.) The Harvey Property's direct access to and from Highway 89 is
limited to a single access opening at the south end of the property. (Id.) UDOT claims
that the direct access is 24 feet wide; Harvey Real Estate claims that it is 33 feet wide.

(14)
5.

The Harvey Property's frontage on Old Mountain Road is located immediately

east of the intersection with Highway 89, and its frontage with Highway 89 begins
immediately south of the intersection. (R. at 546, 554.)
6.

Because Old Mountain Road intersects with Highway 89 only on the east side of

the highway, there are only two properties abutting the intersection. (R. at 554.) There
are no other properties with a size and location similar to that owned by Harvey Real
Estate. (Id)
7.

For public safety reasons, UDOT recently determined to redesign Highway 89 and

certain other intersecting routes, including Old Mountain Road. (R. at 545.)
8.

A significant part of UDOT's reconstruction project involves closing the

intersection of Old Mountain Road with Highway 89, and rerouting Old Mountain Road
to connect with the improved Cherry Hills interchange approximately one-half mile to the
4

south. (R. at 545, 556.) To reroute Old Mountain Road, it will be necessary to build a
frontage road running south to the Cherry Hills Interchange. (R. at 556.) To construct
the frontage road, UDOT is taking approximately 1.31 acres of the Harvey Property. (R.
at 38, 44, 46, 545, 553.)
9.

Significantly, it is because of the Harvey Property's prime location at the

intersection that the property is necessary for the completion of UDOT's project. (R. at
553. 554; see also R. at 470-72.)
10.

Access from the Harvey Property to Old Mountain Road will not be reduced in

size by UDOT's reconstruction project, and frontage on Old Mountain Road for the
Harvey Property will be increased. (R. at 546.) The Harvey Property will retain access to
Old Mountain Road but will no longer have immediate access to Highway 89. (Id.)
11.

Once UDOT's reconstruction is complete, direct access between Highway 89 and

the Harvey Property will be completely lost, (id.), as the frontage road will run the entire
length of the Harvey Property, effectively severing it from Highway 89. (R. at 553). On
the south, traffic will have to go one-half mile south to the Cherry Hill interchange. (R.
at 546-47.) To the north of the Harvey Property there will be no frontage road, so
northbound traffic will have to travel three-fourths of a mile to Nicholls Road through an
existing subdivision to enter the highway, and southbound traffic will have to exit the
highway at 400 North and travel approximately one and a half miles to reach the Harvey
Property. (Id.)
12.

The reconstructed Highway 89 will also be twenty to twenty-five feet below grade

and the Harvey property will suffer from diminished visibility in the after condition. (R.
at 567, p. 33.)

5

13.

If allowed, Harvey Real Estate's experts will testify that the intended use of the

Harvey Property prior to UDOT's proposal to reconstruct Old Mountain Road was for
commercial purposes, and that the highest and best use of the Harvey Property was
commercial. (R. at 547.)
14.

Harvey Real Estate seeks severance damages for the substantial diminution in

value to the Harvey Property caused by UDOT's partial taking of the Harvey Property and
the construction proposed by UDOT. (R. at 443.)
15.

If allowed, Harvey Real Estate's experts will testify that UDOT's taking and

reconstruction of the Old Mountain Road will substantially decrease the value of the
remaining property, and that as a direct result of UDOT's actions, the Harvey Property is
no longer feasible as commercial property. (R. at 436, 547.) Its highest and best use has
changed from commercial to low-end residential. (Id.)
16.

The harm to the remaining property is in the nature of a decrease in the market

value of the land itself, not in the nature of lost business profits. (R. at 442.)
17.

The Harvey property will suffer a peculiar injury that will not be suffered by other

adjacent landowners. (R. at 567, p. 26).
18.

UDOT's experts, if called, will testify that the Harvey Property had limited

commercial value before the condemnation due to the dangers and limitations of the
intersection, and due to the limited size of the frontage, and that after the condemnation
the Harvey Property is equally usable as commercial property compared to its usefulness
before the taking. (R. at 547-48.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Harvey Real Estate is entitled to a reversal of the district court's Order granting
UDOT's Motion in Limine precluding Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence of

6

diminished property value due to UDOT's partial taking and road construction. The
district court erred in concluding that Utah severance law does not take into account such
factors as diminished access, inconvenience of travel, loss of traffic flow and diminished
visibility. Severance damages include any harm that significantly diminishes the market
value of the remaining property so long as there is a partial taking and the harm is a result
of the actual taking or of the "construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
the plaintiff." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1996). Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 7834-10 requires that "the court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be
offered by any of the parties" relating to severance damages. Because the district court
did not allow the jury to hear such evidence, it committed reversible error.

ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-34-10 REQUIRES THAT EVIDENCE
OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES RESULTING FROM UDOT'S
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
The district court erred by precluding Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence
at trial that UDOT's proposed highway reconstruction project, including the closing of
the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection, will cause significant damage to the
remaining Harvey Property. The ruling of the district court effectively denies Harvey
Real Estate from receiving Just Compensation for the taking of its property. The Utah
Constitution, however, guarantees that private property "shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation." Art. 1, § 22. Where a state's action results in
a taking of only part of an individual's property, "the law strives to reimburse the
condemnee for all consequential damages to his property, including damages to the
remainder, or severance damages. Severance damages are part of the Constitutional
7

requirement that no property be taken except for a public purpose and with just and full
compensation therefor paid." 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.01 [1] (3d ed. 2001)
(emphasis added). In Utah, where the condemning authority effects a partial taking of
property, the owner is entitled to severance damages for any resulting harm to the
remaining property. See Utah State Road Common v. Miva, 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah
1974).
The issue of severance damages is properly a question for the jury, as required by
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 (1996). That Section governs the admissibility of
evidence weighing toward severance damages and provides as follows:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2) (1996) (emphasis added). This Section provides that the
jury must be allowed to hear evidence to ascertain and assess what damages will accrue
from the severance of the property taken and what damages arise from the "construction
of the improvement in the manner proposed by [UDOT]." Id.
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have had many occasions to discuss the
boundaries of Section 78-34-10 and previously have held that factors such as diminution
of access, circuity of travel diversion of traffic and diminished visibility are relevant and
weigh toward severance damages if they affect the value of the remaining property. See
Miva. 526 P.2d at 929. See also 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.03[2][b][i] (in a
partial taking, such factors as "circuity of travel, diversion of traffic . . . and
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inconvenience due to construction" are relevant to determining severance damages.)
Utah case law establishes that even those elements of a public construction project
constructed entirely off of but adjacent to, the property being taken are to be considered
in determining severance damages if they result in damage to the remaining property.
Miya, 526 P.2d at 929.
In Miya, the defendant land owner owned approximately 44 acres of farm land,
one boundary of which abutted an existing public highway. Id. at 927. UDOT1 acquired
.66 acre of Miya's land for highway purposes. Id. In the existing highway right of way
located in front of Miya's property, UDOT constructed a viaduct to cross a set of railroad
tracks. IdL at 928. The viaduct was built entirely within the existing public right of way
- no part of the viaduct encroached on Miya's property. Id

As part of the construction

project, a frontage road was built on Miya's property which provided access for that
remaining property, although a minor amount of circuity of travel was added. Id. At
trial, Miya's expert opined that the highest and best use of the land had been for
residential purposes and that the construction of the viaduct would negatively affect the
value of the remaining land, since would-be buyers would not want to buy a home facing
a giant concrete structure, i d at 927-28.
UDOT made the same argument in Miya that it is advancing here, i.e., that the
defendant is not entitled to severance damages because the harm to the remaining land
was not the result of the actual taking. Rather, UDOT argued that the harm was the result
of the construction which occurred off the subject property and on the existing right of
way, and, consequently, the trial court had erred. IdL In other words, UDOT sought to
treat the construction of a viaduct in the public road as separate and distinct from the
1

The Utah State Road Commission changed its name to the Utah Department of
Transportation subsequent to Miva.
9

partial taking of Miya's property or the construction of a frontage road thereon. The Utah
Supreme Court held that Miya was entitled to compensation for the diminution in market
value caused by UDOT's construction project, including construction of the viaduct.

Id.

at 929.
The Miya Court explained that owners of land abutting a public street have
property rights in "access, light, and air," and that such property rights "may not be taken
away or impaired without just compensation." Id. at 928-29 (emphasis added.) Where
construction of a public work in a public highway "violates some right appurtenant to the
abutting property or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury," the owner is
entitled to compensation. Id at 929. See also State v. Hooper, 469 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1970) (showing that the circuity of travel resulting from partial taking is proper
consideration for severance damages); State Road Comm'n v. Utah Sugar Co., 448 P.2d
901, 905 (Utah 1968) ("in assessing severance damages to the remaining property,
consideration may be given to anything resulting from the taking, or the construction of
the improvement which would . . . tend to reduce the value of the remaining property.");
State v. Rozelle. 120 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1941) ("We have held that an abutting property
owner may recover for losses sustained such as a result from the shutting off or
interfering with his access, light, or air").
The harm inflicted on the remaining property in the instant case is of the same kind
inflicted in Miya; as a direct result of the highway construction, the landowner's property
will lose market value due to a significant change in its highest and best use. Harvey
Real Estate's Property is peculiarly injured by UDOT's construction because of (1) the
Harvey Property's unique location directly abutting the intersection (R. at 546, 554), (2)
the Harvey Property's peculiar suitability for commercial development in the "before"
condition (there is no other property abutting the intersection that can be developed
10

commercially) (R. at 547), (3) the diminished visibility as a result of the reconstructed
Highway 89 being built twenty to twenty-five feet below grade (R. at 567, p. 33), and (4)
the partial taking of the Harvey Property and the construction of a frontage road thereon.
(R. at 38, 44, 46, 545 and 553). The Harvey Property, located as it is at the intersection of
Interstate 89 and the Old Mountain Road, is a uniquely valuable piece of real estate. It
abuts and enjoys direct access to and from both roads. Furthermore, Harvey Real Estate's
Property is large enough to be developed commercially, whereas the only other property
that abuts the intersection is too small to be developed. (R. at 554). Before UDOT
announced its plans to restructure the two roads, the Harvey Property was ideally situated
for commercial use. (R. at 547).
Once UDOT has built the frontage road on the land taken from Harvey Real
Estate, the Harvey Property will be separated from Highway 89 by the frontage road. (R.
at 546). To access the remaining Property, potential customers of any commercial
development would have to exit Highway 89 either one-half mile to the south or one and
a half miles to the north of the Harvey Property. (R. at 546-47 and 553). Harvey Real
Estate's experts will testify that UDOT's project will render the Harvey Property no
longer capable of being developed commercially in the "after" condition. (R. at 436,
547). They will also testify that the highest and best use of the Harvey Property will be
changed from commercial to residential, causing substantial diminution in the Harvey
Property's fair market value. (R. at id.). A would-be buyer would not pay the same price
for the Harvey property in the "after" condition as it would in the "before" condition.2 (R.
at id).
2

Circuity of travel, diversion of traffic, obstruction of visibility and inconvenience
due to construction are factors which [though not "property" and hence not compensable in and
of themselves,] may [if there is an accompanying taking] take on a new perspective as elements
that a willing buyer and a willing seller would be forced to consider in arriving at a market
value." 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 16.03[2][[b][i].
11

Just as Miya was entitled to compensation for harm resulting from the total
construction project, including the effects of the viaduct Harvey Real Estate is entitled to
compensation for the harm caused by UDOT's construction project and its effects in toto
on the Harvey Property.3 In Miya, the landowner still had the same amount of access to a
public street, but rather than access to the main highway, the access was on the frontage
road and its invisibility was obstructed b\ the viaduct. In the present case, although the
Harvey Property still has access to a public street, it has lost its immediate access to
Highway 89 and visibility is diminished. The access is now very circuitous and along the
frontage road.
In Miya, the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of the expert witness
as to the effects of the total construction project on the market value of the remaining
land. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that "relevant
factors of severance damage, in ascertaining the fair market value of the remaining parcel,
include impairment of light and air, impairment of view, invasion of privacy, and
deprivation of access.4 Id. at 929.
The Miya Court made it very clear that where there has been a partial taking, "just
compensation is due if the market value of the property has been diminished," and the
court will not consider the effects of the physical taking in isolation from the effects of
3

Contrary to UDOT's position, the Miya court specifically mentioned "access" as a
right appurtenant to property abutting a public street, and further stated that the diminution of
such a right must be compensated. Miya at 928-29.
4

By "deprivation of access" the Court cannot have meant that only a total loss of
access is compensable because the Miya landowner suffered only "a certain amount of circuity of
travel," not a total loss of access. Id at 928. Also, the Court specifically listed access as one of
the rights that "may not be taken away or impaired without just compensation." Id. at 928-29
(emphasis added). Other Utah cases also support the rule that severance damages are to be
calculated with a view to the effects of the construction project as a whole. See, e.g. Three D
Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Utah App. 1988) (where state actions
"substantially diminish property value by impairing appurtenant property rights or causing
'peculiar injury/ owner must be compensated even where there has bee no physical taking).
12

the government action as a whole.

IcL at 928. Where a partial taking has occurred,

diminished access is only one of a number of factors that may affect the value of the
remaining property, and thus is a proper consideration for severance damages. "[T]he
general rule is any type of damage may be considered insofar as it impairs the 'fair market
value' of the remaining property." 7A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.03[2].
Depending on the facts of the case, such factors may include diminution of access, loss of
traffic flow, inconvenience of travel, or anything else that might be expected to negatively
impact the property value. The trier of fact is to "consider all elements which are the
natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price
that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land." 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain §
14A.01[2] (emphasis added). An owner whose remaining property is adversely affected
by one of these various harms is entitled to recover, not for the harm per se, but for any
diminution in property value that results from the harm.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-34-10 requires that in determining severance damages,
the jury must ascertain those "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance [from the portion taken] and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." (emphasis added). UDOT's
argument—that evidence should be limited to those effects that follow strictly from the
taking itself—renders the second element of the statutory language meaningless and is
therefor inappropriate. See supra Part II. This Court, therefore, should reverse the ruling
of the trial court and order that the trial court permit Harvey Real Estate to introduce
evidence at trial that the value of its remaining property has been diminished as a result of
the UDOT construction project, including the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain
Road intersection.

13

II.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 78-34-10
RENDERS CERTAIN TERMS MEANINGLESS.
The district court's reading of Section 78-34-10 is improper in that it restricts
severance damages to those harms flowing only from the actual taking itself, and ignores
the harm caused from the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
UDOT, including the closing of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection. The
trial court's narrow approach to severance damages is in direct conflict with the language
of the statute and renders part of the statute meaningless. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10
provides in relevant part as follows:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
(emphasis added). Section 78-34-10 clearly states that the jury is to consider and evaluate
evidence of harm to the remaining property resulting (1) "by reason of its severance from
the portion sought to be condemned" and (2) by reason of "the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10
(1996). The trial court's interpretation renders the second element meaningless.
It is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation that wherever possible, a
court should "construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms."
Lvonv. Burton. 2000 UT 19,1J17, 5 P.3d 616, 622 (quoting Schurtzv. BMW of N.
Am., Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991)). This Court has stated that "any
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interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be
avoided." Lund v. Brown 2000 UT 75. T23. 11 P.3d 277, 282.
In ruling that Harvey could not submit its evidence on severance damages, See
infra Part I, the trial court based its reasoning on its conclusion that the loss of direct
access to Highway 89 did not result directly from the taking itself.5 But by excluding the
evidence based on this reasoning, the trial court completely read out of Section 78-34-10
the second element that the jury must hear such legal evidence of harm caused by the
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by UDOT. That second element
is completely separate and distinct from the first element which deals with harm caused
by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned. Section 78-34-10(2)
provides for two, distinct elements of damages: (1) damages which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to
be condemned and (2) damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
Plaintiff. The second element does not relate to damages flowing directly from the
taking, but those damages resulting from the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed by UDOT. These are the precise type of damages claimed by Harvey
Real Estate and which the district court excluded.
It is, however, possible to interpret Section 78-34-10 so that full effect is given to
both elements of subsection 2. This interpretation requires that the jury be allowed to see
5

The district court found that evidence of harm to the Harvey Property resulting
from UDOT's highway reconstruction "is not admissible, even though a portion of the subject
property is taken by the action, since the damages alleged are not claimed to be the result of the
loss of the property taken by the condemnation." (R. at 510.) Such a conclusion is plain error.
The effects of the actual taking are indivisible from those of UDOT's reconstruction of the
subject intersection and frontage road. The closure of the intersection depends necessarily on the
construction of the frontage road, which, in turn, depends on UDOT's taking of the Harvey
Property. But for the actual taking, the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection could not
be closed.
15

and evaluate evidence of harm to the remaining property, and that this harm can result
either "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned" or by reason
of "the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2). Not only is this interpretation an entirely plausible reading of
the statute, it is difficult to imagine any other reading which would give meaning and full
effect to all the elements of the language. Moreover, Harvey Real Estate's interpretation
is consistent with prior decisions of this Court. See infra Part I.
Since it is possible to give meaning to all the elements of the statute and since the
trial court's interpretation rendered part of the statute meaningless, the trial court's
reading was an error of law. This Court, therefore, should reverse the decision of the
district court and permit Harvey Real Estate to submit its severance damages evidence to
the jury, including the effects of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection closure
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Harvey Real Estate respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the district court's Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and to remand for
further proceedings. The district court's conclusion that diminished access,
inconvenience of travel, loss of traffic flow and diminished visibility are inapplicable in
evaluating a claim for severance damages contravenes the established law of the state. It
would effectively prevent Harvey Real Estate from presenting evidence of harm accruing
from any part of UDOT's construction project, including the physical taking itself, since
the various aspects of the project are inextricably linked. Harvey Real Estate will be
denied its Constitutional guarantee of just compensation for loss or injury to its property
if the district court's order stands. Furthermore, Section 78-34-10 requires that the jury

16

be given an opportunity to hear expert testimony that UDOT's taking and construction
project will significantly impair the market value of Harvey Real Estate's remaining land.
DATED this

\^

day of August, 2001.
.PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD

ROBERT E. MANfSFtELD
TODD D. WEILEI
Attorneys for Defenahqt/Appellant
Harvey Real Estate, Limited Partnership
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I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and exact copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following party on the fe dav of August,
2001.
Steven F. Alder
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5,h Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
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Addendum A

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 1A
1991 REPLACEMENT

Constitutions and Historical
Documents

THE MICHIE COMPANY
Law Publishers
Charlottesville, Virginia

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

A r t . I, § 2 2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appointment of administrator of estate.
This section prohibits the appointment of a
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's
estate if that person refuses to consent to such
appointment In re Estate of Cluff, 587 P 2d
128 (Utah 1978)

ANALYSIS

In general.
Appointment of administrator of estate
Withholding tax.
In general.
No man can have a vested interest in thee
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to0
insist that another work for him, since thatt
would violate this section. McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938).•.

Withholding tax.
Provision requiring that a city withhold
state income taxes due from employees does
not subject the city to involuntary servitude.
Salt Lake City v State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. J u r . 2d Involuntary
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S.
Slaves § 10
Key Numbers. — Slaves ®=> 24.

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, and does not
require compensation to be paid in advance.
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379,
503 P.2d 144 (1972).

ANALYSIS

Advance payment of compensation.
Airplane overflights.
Closing street.
Consequential damages.
—Railroad.
—Road construction.
—School construction.
Defense to condemnation proceeding.
Elements of taking or damage.
Fair market value.
Section self-executing.
Highway easement.
Intangible factors.
Interest in condemnation proceedings.
Inverse condemnation.
Just compensation.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Removal of personal property.
Services of attorney in defending indigent.
Statute of limitations.
Taxes.
Water rights.
Cited.

Airplane overflights.
For discussion of taking issues in an action
by landowners alleging that their land has
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. U t a h
1986).

Advance p a y m e n t of compensation.
This section provides merely that the prop-

Closing street.
Where city, without notice, petition, or hearing, closes a portion of a street and alley abutting on school board-owned property on both
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned property, there has been a taking requiring just
compensation. Boskovich v. Mid vale City
Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952).
Closing of city street and alleged impairment of access to commercial properties was
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the meaning of this section; the alleged damages resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably
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Addendum B

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 9
1996 REPLACEMENT

Title 78

MICHIE
Law Publishers
Charlottesville, Virginia

the tendered amount of money without raising
any objections to the taking, or reserving any
issues related to the taking, including the date
of valuation, the date of valuation and the date
interest accrues could not be changed. DOT v.
Ogden & Sons, 805 P.2d 173 (Utah 1990).
~ ,
. ,.
-.
0
R e c o v e r y or d a m a g e s from condemnor.
T7_ , < I A - W I in
4
i i 4 4\ 4 i
rovmer ^ \()4--(->\-K) eonlempUiled that damages might flow from occupancy of promises
and that if so, plaintiff should reimburse defendant. North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water &
Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577
(1950)
— F o l l o w i n g dismissal of p r o c e e d i n g s .
City which obtained immediate possession of
water rights but dismissed condemnation proceeding before adjudication of value of property
was liable for all damages caused by the taking
and holding of possession; loss of rents and
deprivation of use of property were among the
losses which could be recovered by the
condemnee in independent action. Moyle v. Salt

Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947).
Suit to enjoin c o n s t r u c t i o n by state.
— Immunity.
Suit to enjoin state road commissioners, as
individual members, and a contractor from pro,
.,
,
. .
,
ceeding with any work on a viaduct to be
,
, • ,.
r , • -m,
—l armut cl f if e hda din b rent
of aplaintiffs
property until
een
P
P i d appropriate money
damages was unsuccessful; commissioners
were engaged m the performance of their duties
m tne
exercise of the police power of the state to
better provide for the orderly flow of traffic and
were thus given the same immunity from suit
as is given to the state or to its commissions,
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 U t a h 2d 379,
503 P.2d 144 (1972).
Cited in Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas,
785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); U t a h Dep't
of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah
1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — The Condemnor's
Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Do-

main Proceedings, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 548.
C.J.S. — 29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 221.
Key N u m b e r s . — Eminent Domain «= 187.

78-34-10. Compensation a n d damages — How assessed.
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value
of each parcel and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by
the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such
damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit
shall be equal to the damages assessed under Subdivision (2) of this
section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except
the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the
damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the
577

4-10

JUDICIAL CODE

remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value of
the portion taken.
(5) As far as practicable compensation must be assessed for each source
of damages separately.
;tory: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
>., 104-34-10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
sion of privacy and deprivation of access) from
construction of viaduct within right of way was
properly admitted. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974).
Construction of viaduct upon public right of
way, allegedly interfering with adjacent landowner's right of access by making it impossible
to use entire width of street to maneuver large
trucks into its warehouse, was not a "taking" of
property for which state was liable. Bailey Serv.
& Supply Corp. v. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n, 533
P.2d 882 (Utah 1975).

ANALYSIS

rse possessors.
il easement.
en of proof.
equential or severance damages.
ritions.
2nce.
es of streets and sidewalks.
determined.
iction.
mictions.
iines.
ic improvement.
*oads.
ts of landowner.
ol property.
s or elements of damages.
ict.
ir rights.

Adverse possessors.
Severance damage to nonowned land held by
peaceable possession was improperly allowed
defendants since they did not own the fee and
their possession had not thereby been disturbed. State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. LeSourd, 24
Utah 2d 383, 472 P.2d 939 (1970).

3SS.

:tion by abutting owner of property against
oad to recover damages to property by
on of construction and operation of railroad
lblic street in front of his property by which
ess and egress to and from property was
sded, and use was otherwise directly afid, came within Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 22;
sure of damages was amount that property
depreciated in market value. Morris v.
?on Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 14, 102 P. 629
'9).
L action condemning land for use in widenand improving an arterial highway, where
ie of right of access to highway appurtenant
he property taken was included in the
rd for the land, the property owners had no
ii for additional damages for loss of access
ie highway from their remaining property,
relationship of the remaining property to
highway was the same as if a new roadway
been constructed adjacent to the property,
h Rd. Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305,
P.2d 917 (1963).
ights of access, light and air are easements
urtenant to land abutting on a street, and
I not be taken or impaired without just
pensation; testimony as to severance dam3 (impairment of light, air and view, inva-

Aerial easement.
Landowner over whose property city condemned an aerial easement was entitled not
only to compensation for diminution in value of
the property directly affected, but severance
damages as well. Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen,
558 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).
Burden of proof.
In proceeding to take private property for
public use, burden is on owner of property to
prove amount of his damages. Tanner v. Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105,121
P. 584 (1911), aff'd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S. Ct. 101,
60 L. Ed. 307 (1915).
Consequential or severance damages.
Church could not recover damages from railroad in independent action because ringing of
bells, sounding of whistles, and noises emanating from railroad locomotives disturbed meetings and exercises conducted in church building, where there was no physical interference
with church property. Twenty-Second Corp. of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 103 P.
243, 140 Am. St. R. 819 (1909).
Except for provisions contained in Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 22, action would not lie for
mere consequential injuries to real property by
reason of construction and operation of rail-
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Addendum C

Steven F. Alder (#0033)
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham (#1231)
Attorney General
Attorneys For Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0216

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

FINDINGS OF FACT

OF

AND
Plaintiff,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
vs.
ON PLAINTIFF'S
HARVEY REAL ESTATE,
Limited Partnership,

MOTION IN LIMINE

Defendant.
Case No.

980700311

Judge

Michael G. Allphin

The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court
on the 19th of January, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. and the parties having submitted memoranda in support
of their positions and the court having heard argument from counsel for the parties, and otherwise
having being fully advised , does HEREBY MAKE THE FOLLOWING:
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Highway 89 from Farmington, Utah to South Ogden, Utah has been used since the

early settlement of this area, as a major route for transportation, and as its use expanded, the road
was improved and the alignment modified.
In the 1950fs, portions of the road were converted to a limited access highway, with

2.

direct access to the improved four lane highway from abutting properties, including the property
owned by the Defendant, being limited and generally restricted.
3.

UDOT has recently determined to redesign Highway 89 for public safety reasons and

considerations.
4.

As part of this major redesign project, UDOT has decided to close the intersection

of the Old Mountain Road with Highway 89 and to construct a frontage road to connect the Old
Mountain Road with an improved Cherry Hills Interchange located approximately Vi mile to the
south.
5.

This condemnation action involves the actual taking of approximately 1.31 acres of

the Defendant's property needed to construct the new frontage road. Exhibit A attached to the
Condemnation Resolution shows the layout of a portion of the Defendant's property that is being
acquired and the location of this property in relation to the location of the existing Highway 89, the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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existing Old Mountain Road, and the adjoining properties.
6.

The Defendant owns approximately 160 acres of vacant land that is currently

accessible from the Old Mountain Road at the northwest corner of Defendant's property by means
of property frontage that abuts the Old Mountain Road as shown on the property ownership plat
Exhibit B.
7.

The Defendant's frontage on Old Mountain Road is located east of the intersection

with Highway 89, and its frontage with Highway 89 begins south of the intersection as shown on
Exhibits A and B.
8.

Direct access from and onto Highway 89 from Defendant's property is prohibited

except for one permitted access gate at the south end of the property that is claimed by the Plaintiff
to be 24 feet in width and claimed by the Defendant to be 33 feet in width. This permitted access
gate on to Highway 89 is being eliminated by this condemnation action.
9.

The existing access from the Defendant's property onto the Old Mountain Road is

not being reduced in size by this project, and access to the new Old Mountain Road/frontage road
will increase accessible frontage for the Defendant's property from the existing 100 feet to over
1,100 feet and will provide the Defendant with reasonable access via the public roads after the
condemnation.
10.

As a result of the intersection closure, traffic will be required to travel along the new

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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frontage road to Cherry Hills Interchange Vi mile south, or north along the existing Old Mountain
Road to Nicholls Road 3/4 mile to access Highway 89; southbound traffic on Highway 89 will be
required to exit at 400 North Street located approximately one and one half (1 Vi) miles north and
travel on the Old Mountain Road. There is no frontage road north of the closed intersection. The
proposed Cherry Hill Interchange and frontage road is shown on Exhibit C and the existing roads
north of the project are shown on Exhibit D.
11.

The Defendant seeks severance damages for the diminution in value to its real

property alleged to be caused by the closure of the Old Mountain Road /Highway 89 Intersection,
and alleged to result in a change in the highest and best use of the property from the before to the
after condition.
12.

The Defendant's experts if called would testify that the closing of the Old Mountain

Road Highway 89 Intersection will substantially decrease the value of the Defendant's property, and
that as a direct result of the closing of the intersection the subject property is no longer usable as
commercial property in the after condition, thus changing its highest and best use and causing
substantial severance damages.
13.

The Plaintiffs experts would testify that the subject property had limited commercial

value before the condemnation due to the dangers and limitations of the intersection and due to the
limited size of the frontage, and that after the condemnation the property is equally usable as

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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commercial as before the condemnation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The closure of the intersection is within the police powers of UDOT and the closure

of the intersection does not require the taking of any portion of the Defendant's property.
2.

The Defendant has no express or implied easement, or other appurtenant property

right to access Highway 89 by means of the intersection with Old Mountain Road, but rather this is
a right that is shared equally by the Defendant with all of the other properties on Old Mountain Road
and with the public at large.
3.

UDOT has jurisdiction to determine the safety of the intersection of Highway 89 and

Old Mountain Road, and has concluded that the current and future use of this intersection creates
unreasonable risks to the public safety.
4.

There can be no recovery for damages associated with the closure of an intersection

adjoining a public street that is used to access a property where access to the public street is not taken
and reasonable access by means of the public streets remains or is otherwise provided.
5.

Inconvenience of travel occasioned by being required to follow a more circuitous

route due to a completed highway project is not a proper subject for a damage award.
6.

Loss of traffic flow is non-compensable, and evidence of possible devaluation in the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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property value due to loss of traffic flow past a property is not allowed.
7.

Where a condemnation and taking of real property occurs, there must be a causal

connection between the taking of the property as part of a condemnation action, and the damages
claimed; and where the damages are the result of the intersection closure, and not the result of the
loss of property taken, they are not compensable.
8.

Evidence of alleged damages from the intersection closure is not admissible, even

though a portion of the subject property is taken by the action, since the damages alleged are not
claimed to be the result of the loss of the property taken by the condemnation.
9.

The Defendant is not entitled to compensation for the loss of access due to the closure

of the intersection where neighboring properties that are similarly impacted by the intersection
closure would not be entitled to seek compensation.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311

6

0051C

10.

Appraisal testimony concerning the effect of the road closure on the value of

subject property is not to be admitted.
DATED this _[_ day of Awkf2000.
BY THE COURT

MICHAEL G. ALLPH
District Court Judge

ROBERT E.\MANSFIE\,D
Attorney for tlkDefendant

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE was mailed, first class,
postage prepaid, this ol & day of April, 2000, to:
Robert E. Mansfield
Parry Anderson & Mansfield
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Case No. 980700311
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Addendum D

DEC 1 1 2000
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

Steven F. Alder (#0033)
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham (#1231)
Attorney General
Attorneys For Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O.Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0216

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT
TRANSPORTATION,

ORDER

OF

ON PLAINTIFF'S
Plaintiff,
MOTION IN LIMINE
vs.
HARVEY REAL ESTATE,
Limited Partnership,
Defendant.

Case No.

980700311

Judge

Michael G. Allphin

The Plaintiffs Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before the above entitled Court
on the 19th day of January, 2000 at 8:00 a.m., and the parties having submitted memoranda in support
of their positions, and the Court having heard argument from counsel for the parties, and otherwise
having being fully advised, the Court DOES HEREBY
ORDER ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the Defendant's experts are precluded from

00525

testifying as to any loss of value due to the road closing, and the jury shall be instructed that no
recovery is appropriate for the effect of the closure of the intersection of the Old Mountain Road
with Highway 89 on the value of the Defendant's property.
DATED this _ ^ L day of

M^~

2000.
BY THE COURT

MICHAEL G.ALLPHIN,
District Court Judge

Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Civil No. 980700311
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this

jUfce^iiJ*-*

-

/

day of

2000, to:

Robert E. Mansfield
Parry Anderson & Mansfield
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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Order on Plaintiffs Motion In Limine
Civil No. 980700311
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